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COMMENT

The Scope of the Public Duty/Special
Duty Doctrine in Illinois: Municipal

Liability for Failure to Provide Police
Protection
I.

INTRODUCTION

Municipalities' traditionally have been shielded from liability for
conduct which can be characterized as a failure to provide general
police protection. Courts provided this insulation from liability in two
ways. Most jurisdictions applied the doctrine of governmental
immunity 2 to shield municipalities from liability arising from their
tortious conduct during the performance of "governmental" functions.3 It is generally agreed that a municipality performs a governmental function when it provides police protection to the general
public.4 When a governmental entity or its employee is protected by
immunity, the person injured by the tortious conduct is barred from
asserting what otherwise may be a meritorious claim.'
The second method of limiting municipal liability within the
context of providing general police protection is through the judicial
1. For the purposes of common-law immunity, a distinction was drawn
between municipal corporations and quasi-municipal corporations. For a discussion
of the differences, see infra text accompanying notes 48-51. The distinction, however,
has generally been abandoned in those states where common-law immunity doctrines
have been supplanted by a tort claims act.
2. The terms sovereign immunity and governmental immunity are closely
related. Some authorities distinguish them defining sovereign immunity as a commonlaw doctrine applying only to the state, whereas governmental immunity applies to
all levels of government. See 2 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUsE & A. GANS, TiE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS § 6.2 (1985) [hereinafter 2 SPEISER].
3. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 n.27 (1980) (the
Court discusses the history of immunity as applied to municipal corporations); see
also infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
4. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR'ORATIONS § 53.51 (3d rev.
ed. 1984). Although courts agreed that the municipal function of providing police
protection is "governmental," there was general disagreement among jurisdictions
over which municipal functions should be classified as "governmental" and thus
immune, and which municipal functions should be classified as "proprietary" and
thus subject to potential liability. See infra text accompanying notes 115-117.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A introductory note (1977).
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application of the public duty doctrine. The public duty doctrine is
based on the premise that a governmental entity 6 owes a duty to the
general public for the performance of certain functions of government.7 Therefore, the governmental entity is not liable for a breach
of a public duty which may injure any specific individual. 8 Under this
doctrine, the duty of a municipality to provide police protection to
its inhabitants is considered to be a duty owed to the general public. 9
When a municipality fails to provide, or inadequately provides, police
protection, an individual injured as a result is prevented from establishing a cause of action by an application of the public duty doctrine.
An exception to the public duty doctrine is generally recognized.
The municipality may be held liable if a special duty is owed to the
injured individual. 0 For a special duty to exist, the plaintiff must
establish a special relationship with the municipality or its employee
which sets the plaintiff apart from the general public." The criteria
that courts use to determine whether a plaintiff has established a
special duty vary greatly among jurisdictions.12 The mere existence of
6. "Governmental entity" includes the state and its subdivisions as well as
local governmental units.
7. See Fessler by Fessler v. R.E.J., Inc., 161 Ill. App. 3d 290, 295, 514 N.E.2d
515, 518 (4th Dist. 1987) (public duty rule applied to a failure to provide police
protection), appeal denied, 118 Il1. 2d 542 (1988); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park,
279 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1979) (public duty rule applied to a failure to make a
fire code inspection).
8. See Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (W. Va. 1989) (providing a
general discussion of the public duty doctrine).
9. See Turner v. United States and Creek Nation of Indians, 248 U.S. 354,
357-58 (1919) ("Like other governments, municipal as well as state, the Creek Nation
was free from liability for injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or
failure to keep the peace."); Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 111. 2d 361, 363, 243 N.E.2d
214, 216 (1968) (municipality held not liable for failure to protect an individual from
racial violence).
10. Huey, 41 111. 2d at 363, 243 N.E.2d at 216.
11. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 53.04(b).
12. Compare Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806-07
(Minn. 1979) (four factors to be considered in assessing a special duty: (1) the
government's knowledge of the dangerous condition; (2) reasonable reliance by
persons on the government's representations and conduct which cause the persons to
forego other alternatives for protecting themselves; (3) an ordinance or statute setting
forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons; (4)
the government's use of due care to avoid increasing the risk of harm) and Cuffy v.
City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 505 N.E.2d 937, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1987). Four
elements must be established under this test for a special duty to exist:
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an
affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2). knowledge
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a special duty, however, does not establish liability on the part of the
municipality. Once the plaintiff has established that a special duty
was owed to him by the municipal defendant, the plaintiff must still
establish as elements of his cause of action that the duty was breached
and that his injury proximately resulted from the breach.' 3
Whether applying governmental immunity or the public duty
doctrine, similar reasons are advanced in support of limiting the
liability of municipalities for the function of providing general police
protection. These reasons address public policy concerns regarding
the effect expanded liability would have on the economic and functional aspects of municipal government. First, it is asserted that
municipalities could not bear the economic hardship of expanded tort
liability.' 4 As a consequence of having to satisfy additional judgments
against the municipality, funds would be diverted from public use. 5
on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm;
(3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the
injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's
affirmative undertaking.
Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 260, 505 N.E.2d at 940, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 375; with Bailey v.
Town of Forks, 108 Wash. 2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987). Delineating five situations
in which a special duty is established:
(1) when the terms of a legislative enactment evidence an intent to identify
and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons ... ; (2) where
governmental agents responsible for enforcing statutory requirements possess
actual knowledge of a statutory violation, fail to take corrective action
despite a statutory duty to do so, and the plaintiff is within the class the
statute intended to protect . . . ; (3) when governmental agents fail to
exercise reasonable care after assuming a duty to warn or come to the aid
of a particular plaintiff . . . ; (4) where a relationship exists between the
governmental agent and any reasonably foreseeable plaintiff, setting the
injured plaintiff off from the general public and the plaintiff relies on
explicit assurances given by the agent or assurances inherent in a duty vested
in a governmental entity .. .;
Bailey, 108 Wash. 2d at 268, 737 P.2d at 1260 (citations omitted). The court added
that a fifth situation which would create a special duty would occur when a
governmental agency is operating in a proprietary rather than a governmental
function. Id.
13. See Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 387 S.E.2d 307, 310 (W. Va. 1989)
(providing a general discussion of the special duty exception to the public duty
doctrine).
14. See Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 502, 590 P.2d 647, 650 (1979) (no
duty owed to plaintiff when police failed to respond quickly enough to reports of a
sexual assault; to hold otherwise would lead to a "staggering" potential for liability).
15. See Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. 1981) (no duty
owed to plaintiff when police failed to adequately respond to a report of a burglary
in progress; the result of imposing a duty in such cases would be that time and
money would be spent on litigation rather than on governmental services).
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Second, opponents of expanded tort liability contend that it would
hinder the effectiveness of government. Specifically, it is argued that
the courts should not review the discretionary decisions of a coordinate
branch of government within the context of a tort action.' 6 Therefore,
discretionary decisions, such as how and when police resources should
be allocated, should not be subject to judicial second-guessing. 7 In
addition, it is suggested that expanded liability might deter a police
officer from acting in situations where her conduct might expose a
third party to a risk of injury.'" Furthermore, public service may
become unattractive where expanded municipal liability exposes municipal employees to a greater potential for suit. 9
Proponents of expanded municipal liability dispute the contention
that it would negatively affect municipal government. In response to
the prediction of adverse economic consequences resulting from expanded liability, it is argued that municipalities are able to bear the
burden of tort liability through the purchase of insurance or the
creation of reserve funds.20 Some courts also maintain that an application of traditional tort principles would be adequate to limit the
liability of municipalities, just as these principles protect private
individuals and corporations from excess liability. 2 Furthermore,
modern concepts of justice favor compensating an individual whose
injury results from the tortious conduct of a municipality or its
16. See Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 157, 444 A.2d 1379,
1384 (1982) (No duty owed to plaintiff injured by a drunken driver whom police
failed to stop. Imposing a duty "would cramp the exercise of official discretion
beyond the limits desirable in our society."); Seibring v. Parcell's, Inc., 159 Ill. App.
3d 676, 680, 512 N.E.2d 394, 397 (4th Dist. 1987) (discretion for officers in the field
is necessary to prevent constant consultation with superiors concerning priorities).
17. Seibring, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 680, 512 N.E.2d at 397.
18. See Warren, 444 A.2d at 9. The threat of liability on public officials "would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute." 444 A.2d at 9 (quoting Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
19. See id.

20. See Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 309-10, 656 P.2d 597, 598-99 (1982)
(noting the legislature's requirements for insurance coverage for state agencies as a
solution to the greater potential for liability resulting from the abolition of sovereign
immunity); Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 292, 669 P.2d
451, 461 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring) (contending that governmental tort liability
should have coextensive limits with the liability of private corporations).
21. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986) (rejecting the public duty
doctrine in favor of conventional tort principles); Chambers-Castanes,100 Wash. 2d
at 290, 669 P.2d at 460 (Utter, J., concurring) (would apply conventional tort
principles to reach the same result as the majority who used the public duty doctrine
to find defendant did not owe a duty to provide police protection to plaintiff).
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employees. 22 It is reasoned that when the defendant is a municipality
the loss can be distributed over the public at large rather than fall
solely upon the injured individual. 23 In addition, compensating an
individual for injuries recieved as a result of a municipality's tortious
conduct is considered by some to be a proper expenditure of public
funds. 24 Although the government is not the insurer of the public
safety, the argument has been made that the government should be
responsible for those risks that it unreasonably imposes on a particular
individual. 25 Proponents of expanded municipal liability also contend
that since the courts, within the context of a tort action, often review
municipal decisions concerning the allocation of resources for nonpolice operations, a different standard should not be applied to the
police department based on the presumption that governmental effectiveness is at stake.

26

Because the public policy arguments on both sides of the issue
are persuasive, the public duty/special duty doctrine has received
diverse treatment among the states. Some states have chosen to
eliminate the doctrine entirely, reasoning that it is a throwback to

sovereign immunity. 27 Many states, however, continue to recognize

22. See Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United
States 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 795, 796.
23. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 II. 2d 11, 21,
163 N.E.2d 89, 94 (1959) (quoting Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 88, 136
P.2d 480, 482 (1943)), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
24. See Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d at 22, 163 N.E.2d at 94 (the court disagreed that
the payment of damages to children injured when a school bus crashed was an
improper diversion of the school district's educational funds).
25. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 583, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968) (the court recognized the public duty doctrine as
applying to the case at bar, but stated that an exception would apply when the police
undertake the duty to protect an individual then expose him to risks which result in
an actual injury).
26. Id. at 903-04, 240 N.E.2d at 864, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (Keating, J.,
dissenting) (would find no basis for treating the police department different from
other operations of the government for purposes of tort liability).
27. The following states have rejected the public duty doctrine-Alaska: Adams
v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976) ("Where there is no immunity, the state
is to be treated like a private litigant."); Arizona: Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310,
656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982) ([T]he parameters of duty owed by the state will ordinarily
be coextensive with those owed by others."); Colorado: Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d
152, 160 (Colo. 1986) ("[T]he duty of a public entity shall be determined in the same
manner as if it were a private party."); Florida: Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River Cty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979) (public duty doctrine is a function of
sovereign immunity, which was abolished); Iowa: Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d
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the public duty doctrine and apply it as a means of limiting the
28
liability of governmental entities.
In Illinois, the public duty doctrine, in regard to the duty to
provide police protection, is codified in section 4-102 of the Local
Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. 9 Illinois courts also recognize the special duty exception to the public
duty rule.3 0 Because of the strict requirements of the special duty test
which is generally applied by Illinois courts, it is of limited usefulness
to a plaintiff in establishing a cause of action against a municipality.
The purpose of this article is to examine the application of the
public duty doctrine and the special duty exception in Ilinois. This
664, 671 (Iowa 1979) ("[T]he abrogation of governmental immunity means the same
principles of liability apply to officers and employees of municipalities as to any
other tort defendant ....

"); New Mexico: Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs of

County of Bernalillo, 101 N.M. 671, 674, 687 P.2d 728, 731 (1984) (public duty
doctrine was a function of sovereign immunity which was abolished by the tort claims
statute); Oregon: Brennen v. Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979) (tort immunity
statute adequately provides for govermental liability protection without the addition
of the public duty doctrine); Wisconsin: Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d
526, 537, 247 N.W.2d 132, 138 (1976) (public duty doctrine is inconsistent with the
state's position on municipal liability); Wyoming: DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643,
653 (Wyo. 1986) (reasoning that the public duty doctrine is a form of sovereign
immunity which was legislatively abolished).
28. See, e.g., Connecticut: Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 444
A.2d 1379 (1982); District of Columbia: Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d
1 (D.C. 1981); Indiana: Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. App. 1980); Kansas:
Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1986); Maryland:
Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986); Michigan:
Markis v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, 180 Mich. App. 545, 448 N.W.2d 352 (1989),
appeal denied, (1988); Missouri: Schutte v. Sitton, 729 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App. 1987);
Nevada: Parker v. Mineral County, 102 Nev. 593, 729 P.2d 491 (1986); New Jersey:
Lee v. Doe, 232 N.J. Super. 569, 557 A.2d 1045 (1989); Pennsylvania: Caldwell v.
City of Philadelphia, 358 Pa. Super. 406, 517 A.2d 1296 (1986), appeal denied, 517
Pa. 597 (1987); South Carolina: Rayfield v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections,
297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379
S.E.2d 133 (1989); West Virginia: Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 387 S.E.2d 307 (W.
Va. 1989).
29. Section 4-102 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act provides:
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to
establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service
or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate
police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes,
failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to identify or apprehend
criminals. This immunity is not waived by a contract for private security
service, but cannot be transferred to any non-public entity or employee.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
4-102 (1987).
30. See infra text accompanying note 152.
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article will first discuss the development of the immunity doctrine and
the collateral public duty doctrine. Recent Illinois cases applying the
public duty doctrine and special duty exception to situations involving
claims of failure to provide police protection will be analyzed. Finally,
possible modifications to Illinois' approach to the problem will be
examined.

II. BACKGROUND
The public duty doctrine and the doctrine of governmental immunity both insulate from liability those functions which policy
dictates should not be subject to review in a tort action." While
recognized as separate doctrines, in practice they often achieve the
same results.12 For that reason, it is informative to consider the origins
and early applications of both the immunity doctrine and the public
duty doctrine.
A.

IMMUNITY AS APPLIED TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is said to have its philosophical basis in the English concept that "the King can do no wrong.""
This reasoning was not directly applicable in the United States where
no monarchy exists.3 4 The underlying rationale, however, was adopted
by some courts in this country and restated: In the absence of consent
to be sued, a claim should not be able to be enforced against the
authority that makes the laws upon which the claim depends.3"
The adoption of sovereign immunity by the United States was
3 6
probably a result of the acceptance of English legal traditions.
31. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 32,
163 N.E.2d 89, 100 (1959) (Davis, J., dissenting) (noting that the justification for
immunity is based on public policy), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Porter v. City

of Urbana, 88 Ill. App. 3d 443, 445, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (4th Dist. 1980) (stating

that a direct explanation for the public duty doctrine rests on public policy).
32. Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36, 37 (W. Va. 1989) (the court applied the
public duty rule and held the city not liable for failure to inspect an apartment for
fire code violations; plaintiff's suit would have been foreclosed by governmental
immunity, prior to its abolition).
33. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 53.02; see also Bouchard, Government
Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1924).
34. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 152

(1972).
35. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (sovereign immunity
was held to apply to Hawaii, a territory of the United States, because the administrative authority of the territory gave it the power to change the laws of contract and
property upon which the plaintiff's right to sue depended).
36. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 163.
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Sovereign immunity, as applied to the federal government, has no
evident constitutional basis. In 1846 the doctrine of sovereign immunity was embraced by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. McLemore.17 The Court held that a circuit court did not
have jurisdiction to hear a claim against the United States, because
the federal government was immune from suit." The rationale expressed by the court was that "the government is not liable to be
sued, except with its own consent, given by law." 3 9
The doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to the federal
0
government was limited by the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946.4
This Act, in effect, provided the federal government's consent to suit
within the parameters of the act.
B. IMMUNITY AS APPLIED TO THE STATES

Application of sovereign immunity to the states occurred with
the adoption of the eleventh amendment. 4' In Chisolm v. Georgia,42
the United States Supreme Court allowed the State of Georgia to be
sued in federal court by a citizen of South Carolina. As a reaction to
Chisolm, the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution
was passed which prohibited federal courts from hearing suits brought
by a citizen of one state against any other state. Subsequently, the
Court interpreted the eleventh amendment as prohibiting federal
courts from hearing suits brought by a citizen of a state against his
own state, in the absence of the state's consent to be sued. 43
37. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).

38. United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (McLemore
brought an action in equity in the circuit court seeking to have the United States
enjoined from pursuing a judgment against him claiming that he had paid the debt).
39. Id.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982) (Federal Tort Claims Act; jurisdiction for tort
claims action); 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982) (venue in tort claims action); 28 U.S.C. §
2401 (1978) (time for commencing tort action); 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1954) (denial of
jury trial in tort claim); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1974) (Federal Tort Claims Act;
procedure).
41. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI states:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.

42. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
43. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 5 (1890). However, a state may waive
its immunity by expressly consenting to a suit against it in federal court. See Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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The modern trend is toward an expansion of the state's liability
for its tortious conduct." Even those states which have abolished or
substantially limited immunity, however, generally retain immunity

for discretionary functions or duties. 45 Discretionary immunity protects those activities which are legislative in nature or executive

conduct which involves policy judgment. Therefore, discretionary
immunity covers most activities performed at the planning level of
state government.4 Conduct in the execution of state policy, however,

may not be immune from suit.

C. IMMUNITY AS APPLIED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

The immunity of various local governmental units flows from a

different historical source.4 7 Traditionally, courts drew a distinction

between two categories of local governmental entities: quasi-municipal
corporations and municipal corporations. A quasi-municipal corpo-

ration is created as a subdivision of the state to aid in the administration of sovereign affairs. 4 As an arm of the state, quasi-municipal49
corporations were accorded the benefit of total sovereign immunity.

Conversely, a municipal corporation is generally chartered by the state
with the consent of the municipality's inhabitants.50 A municipal
corporation is said to act primarily for the benefit of its inhabitants."
It is also recognized, however, that a municipality can sometimes

function much like a private corporation thereby acting for its own

benefit.5 2 Courts granted immunity to municipal corporations for
those functions that were essentially governmental in nature and for
the benefit of the general public. 3
44. See 2 SPEISER, supra note 2, § 6.16.
45. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie Supp. 1989); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-820.01 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 8 n.71 (1989).
46. See Dalehite v. United States 346 U.S. 15, 34-36 (1953) (discussing the
nature of discretionary acts as applicable to the Federal Tort Claims Act).
47. See 5 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §
17.27 (1985).
48. See C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOcAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 1.5 at 5
(1980) (general discussion of the nature of quasi-municipal and municipal corporations).
494, 499, 101 N.E. 960, 962
49. See Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 I11.
(1913) (discussing the differences between quasi-municipal and municipal corporations).
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally Doddridge, The Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations,23 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1925).
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The immunity of quasi-municipal corporations may be attributed
to a decision of the King's Bench in 1788. In Russell v. Men of

Devon 4 the plaintiff's wagon was damaged while crossing a public
bridge. The bridge was in a state of disrepair and the county had the

obligation of maintenance." The court held the county not liable for
two reasons. First, a tort action could not be maintained against a
county where the legislature had not specifically granted the authority
to do so.5 6 Second, the county possessed no corporate fund from

which damages could be paid. 7 This would have resulted in damages
being levied on one individual, or separate actions being brought
against each individual in the county. 8 In sustaining the defendant's
demurrer the court reasoned that "it is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience." 5 9 The rationale from Russell was first adopted in the United
States by a Massachusetts court in 1812 in Mower v. Inhabitants of
Leicester6° which held a county immune from tort liability. 6

A different rationale was applied in the case of municipal corporations. 6 2 A municipality was viewed as having a dual nature; it
could act in a governmental capacity, or a proprietary capacity.63
When a municipality performs a governmental function it exercises
its power in the performance of a public duty.6 Whereas, when a
municipality performs a proprietary function it exercises its private,
54. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
55. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 360 (K.B. 1788).
56. Id. at 362.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 9 Mass. 247, 6 Am. Dec. 63 (1812) (plaintiff sued for the loss of his horse,
killed as a result of a fall on a bridge in disrepair which the county was obligated to
maintain).
61. The court's rationale paralleled that of Russell. Quasi-municipal corporations are created by the legislature for the purposes of public policy and are not
subject to liability unless the action is granted by law. Mower v. Inhabitants of
Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 6 Am. Dec. 63 (1812).
62. See Kramer, supra note 22, at 815 (providing a historical perspective of the
development of immunity as applied to municipal corporations).
63. Apparently the distinction originated in Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3
Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (1842) holding that the erection of a dam on a river was
a proprietary function and that the city was liable for damages due to negligent
construction. Thereafter, the governmental/proprietary distinction became the prevailing doctrine for analyzing when immunity should apply to municipal conduct.
See also Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 I11.
494, 497, 101 N.E. 960, 962 (1913).
64. See MCQUMIIN, supra note 4, § 53.24.
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corporate power. 65 Courts used this to distinguish between the func-

tions of government which merited immunity and those which should
be subject to potential liability. Thus, a municipality is immune from
suit in tort when performing a governmental function, while it is
66
potentially liable when performing a proprietary function. Application of this distinction drew criticism, however, due to the difficulty61
in distinguishing whether a function is governmental or proprietary.
Certain municipal conduct may share characteritics of each category.
Under the governmental/proprietary distinction, the operation of 6a
police department by a municipality is a governmental function. 1
Therefore, a municipality is immune from suit for a failure to provide
adequate police protection under this doctrine. 69
The rationale asserted by the courts for granting immunity to
municipalities during performance of their governmental functions is
that the public nature of the municipality is not analogous to a private
70
individual or private corporation for purposes of tort liability. First,
unlike a private corporation, the performance of a governmental
function by the municipality benefits the public only. The municipality
derives no profit from performing functions such as providing police
and fire protection. 7' Second, the functions of a municipality are
sometimes required by the legislature. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to hold the municipality liable where it has not voluntarily
assumed the function. 72 Third, in performing duties required of the
municipality by state law, public officers are agents of the state rather
65. See McQuILLIN, supra note 4, § 53.23.

66. See Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations,
16 OR. L. REV. 250, 268-69 (1937) (providing a historical perspective of the governmental/proprietary distinction).
67. In Illinois, for example, the maintenance of streets, sidewalks, bridges, and
viaducts, the operation of public utilities, and the collection of garbage and rubbish
were held to be proprietary functions. However, the exercise of police and fire
protection duties, the maintenance of parks, playgrounds, and swimming pools were
held to be governmental functions. See J. APPLEMAN, 2 PREPARING AND TRYING
CASES IN ILLINOIS 1821-1839 (1951); see also cases cited infra notes 97-99.
68. See McQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 53.51.
69. See 1. SILVER, POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 10.03 (1989).

70. See Van Astyne, Government Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966

U. ILL. L. F. 919, 923 (advancing the rationale that public entities cannot avoid

certain risks by refusing to perform a function).
71. See Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 389, 189 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (1963)
(quoting City of Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 284, 156 N.E. 210, 211-12
(1927)).
72. Id. at 388, 189 N.E.2d at 861.
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than the municipality; thus the doctrine of respondeat superior does

not apply to the municipality.73
The distinction between quasi-municipal and municipal corporations drew criticism as unnecessarily complicating the determination
of tort liability.7" As a result, modern tort claims acts do not recognize
the distinction."S Most states have now enacted a tort claims act or
similar legislation which provides a basis for determining the immunity
or potential liability of the state and local governmental units.16 These

73. See Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332 I11. 70, 75, 163 N.E. 361, 364 (1928)
(distinguishing proprietary nature of municipal government from its governmental
nature).
74. See Barnett, supra note 66, at 265.
75. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 1 1-206 (1987). Providing in pertinent
part:
'Local public entity' includes a county, township, municipality, municipal
corporation, school district, school board, forest preserve district, sanitary
district, and all other local governmental bodies.
Id.
76. See ALA. CODE §§ 11-93-1 to 11-93-3 (1985); ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-60 to 419-74 (1982 & Supp. 1989); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.50.250 to 09.50.300 (Supp. 1989);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-820 to 12-826 (1982 & Supp. 1989); ARK. CODE ANN.
83 21-9-201 to 21-9-304 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810 to
996.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-10-101 to 24-10-120
(1988 & Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 53 §§ 4-141 to 4-165(b) (West
1988 & Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4001 to 4013 (Supp. 1988); D.C.
CODE §§ 1-1201 to 1-1225 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 1986 & Supp.
1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-33-1 to 36-33-6 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 662-1 to
662-17 (1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-901 to 6-928 (1979 & Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 85 1 1-101 to 10-101 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to 34-4-16.5-19
(West 1983 & Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 25.1 to 25.8 (West 1989); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 613A.1 to 613A.13 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
75-6101 to 75-6119 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8101 to 8118 (1980 & Supp. 1989); MD.
STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to 12-406 (1984 & Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-401 to 5-404 (1984 & Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 258, §§ I to 12 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1401
to 691.1414 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.01 to 466.15 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN.
88 11-46-1 to 11-46-21 (Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 537.600 to 537.650
(Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988); Mo.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 537.700 to 537.755 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-9-101 to 2-9-805 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-901 to 13-926 (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.035 to 41.039 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 541-B:1 to 541-B:22 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 59:12-3
(West 1982 & Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-29 (1989); N.Y. JUD.
LAW §§ 8 to 28 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143.291 to 143.300.1 (1987 &
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acts generally may be grouped into two categories. One group of acts
77
provides liability as the general rule subject to stated limitations.
The other group of acts establish immunity as the rule subject to
7
exceptions providing for potential liability. " Some of these acts may
incorporate aspects of the common law immunity distinctions in
establishing their limitations or exceptions. For example, some tort
claim acts continue to insulate the discretionary conduct of government from liability. 79 Also, the public duty doctrine, in regard to
potential liability for failure to provide police protection, has been
80
codified within the tort claims act in some states.

Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-12-01 to 32-12-04 (1976 & Supp. 1989);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 32-12.1-01 to 32-12.1-15 (Supp. 1989); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2743.01 to 2743.72 (Baldwin 1981 & Supp. 1989); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2744.01 to 2744.09 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47 §§ 151 to 171
(West 1988 & Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260 to 30.300 (1988); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 8521 to 8528 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8541 to 8564 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1989); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310
(Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 to 9-31-12 (1985 & Supp. 1989);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to 15-78-190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN.

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-101 to 9-8§§ 29-20-101 to 29-20-407 (1980 & Supp.

§§ 3-21-1 to 3-21-11 (Supp. 1989);

407 (1987 & Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN.

1989); TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001 to 101.109 (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1989); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE §§ 104.001 to 104.008 (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1989); TEX. Crv. PRtc. & REM. CODE §§ 107.001 to 107.005 (Vernon Supp.

1989);

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-38 (1989);

VT. STAT. ANN.

tit.

12, §§

5601 to 5605 (1973 & Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to 8.01-195.9 (1984
& Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-222 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.92.005 to 4.92.200 (1988 & Supp. 1989); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.96.010 to
4.96.030 (1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 14-2-1 to 14-2-29 (1985 & Supp. 1989); W. VA.
CODE §§ 29-12A-1 to 29-12A-17 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West Supp. 1989);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.82 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-39-101
to 1-39-120 (1988).
77. See, e.g., Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
to 24-10-120 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Illinois Local Governmental and
24-10-101
§§
1-101 to 10Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
101 (1987); Minnesota Tort Claims Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.01 to 466.15
(West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
78. See, e.g., California Tort Claims Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810 to 996.6
(West 1980 & Supp. 1990); New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1
to 59:12-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. 27 §§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-29 (1989).
79. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 820.2 (West 1980); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85,
2-201 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
80. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 845 (West 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
4-102 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-4 (1982).
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THE PUBLIC DUTY/SPECIAL DUTY DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED
STATES

The public duty/special duty doctrine was first recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in 1855 in the case of South v. Maryland.8 In South, the sheriff of Washington County, Maryland was
alleged to have failed to protect the plaintiff from kidnapping and
extortion. The plaintiff claimed the sheriff had knowledge of these
events, yet he failed to act. 8 2 The Court characterized the sheriff's
duty to preserve the peace as a duty to the public in general.83 The
Court held that the sheriff would not be liable in a civil action for
the breach of a public duty.8 4 The Court's decision was based on
common law principles under which a sheriff was subject to civil
liability only in two circumstances. First, an officer may be liable for
his tortious conduct when acting in a ministerial capacity.85 Second,
the officer may be liable if he acts maliciously and hinders a person
from the enjoyment of a "special individual right, privilege, or
franchise. 8 6 Subsequently, the public duty doctrine gained general
acceptance as a method of narrowing the potential liability of governmental entities and employees.87
III.
A.

HISTORY IN ILLINOIS

IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS

1. State Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was specifically enunciated
in the 1870 Constitution of the State of Illinois. Article IV, paragraph
26 specified that, "The state of Illinois shall never be made defendant
in any court of law or equity." 8 The Illinois Constitution of 1970
limited the broad grant of sovereign immunity contained in the 1870
Constitution. Article 13, paragraph 4 of the 1970 Constitution states
81. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
82. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 398-99 (1855).
83. Id. at 402.
84. Id. at 403.
85. Id. at 402.
86. Id. at 403 (as an example of this second cause of action the Court cited to
an English case, Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (1790), in which a sheriff was
held liable in a civil action for refusing to accept a citizen's validly cast vote).
87. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
88. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 26 (1870).
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that, "Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign
immunity is abolished." 8 9
Prior to this constitutional change, the Illinois legislature responded to the need to provide a plaintiff with a mechanism through
which a tort claim against the state may be pursued. The Court of
Claims Act of 194590 established an administrative agency which9 could
provide a plaintiff with a remedy for a meritorious tort claim. ' This
act was evidence of the state's "consent" to limited tort liability, and
92
a rejection of the rationale of absolute sovereign immunity.
2.

Immunity of Local Governmental Units

a.

Quasi-municipal Corporations

The immunity of the state was extended to quasi-municipal corporations in Illinois in a series of decisions beginning in 1844 with
93
Hedges v. The County of Madison. In Hedges, the plaintiff sought to
recover damages for the death of his horse resulting from a fall on a
94
bridge negligently maintained by the county. The Illinois Supreme
Court reasoned that the county, as a subdivision of state government,
was an involuntary association created by law for the benefit of the
public. 95 As such, its funds could not be diverted for the purpose of
private indemnification unless specified by statute.9 The reasoning of
9
Hedges was echoed in later decisions holding that townships, " school
89. ILL. CONST. art. XIII,

§ 4.

439.1 to 439.25 (1945) (current version at
90. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
ch. 37, 1 439.1 to 439.25 (1987)).
91. In bringing a claim against the state before the Court of Claims, the ground
for the action must be one that is recognized by civil courts in Illinois. Futhermore,
the Act requires that the plaintiff must exhaust all other sources of recovery before
the Court will make an award. This may mean bringing an action against other
private individuals prior to making a claim against the state. Raucci, The Illinois
Court of Claims: Its Purpose and Procedures, 77 ILL. B.J. 752, 752-53 (1989).
92. See Lousin, The 1970 Illinois Constitution:Has It Made a Difference?, 8

N. ILL. U.L. REv. 571, 585 (1988) (discussing the effect of the constitutional change
on the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Illinois).
93. 6 Il. (1 Gilm.) 567 (1844).
94. Hedges v. County of Madison, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 567, 569 (1844).
95. Id. at 570.
96. Id. at 571.
97. See Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 111. 346, 8 Am. Rep. 652 (1870)
(township was immune as a quasi-municipal corporation from suit brought by plaintiff
who became ill while attempting to extricate his team and wagon which became mired
in a public road which the township failed to repair).
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districts, 9 and park districts" were quasi-municipal corporations.

b. Municipal Corporations
The application of immunity to municipal corporations in Illinois
reflects the difficulty that courts encountered in reconciling the need
to protect some activities of municipal government from liability with
the recognition that a municipal corporation often functions much
like a private corporation and should be subject to the same scope of
°
liability.' 0 In Browning v. City of Springfield,10 the Illinois Supreme

Court held that a municipal corporation was potentially liable in a
02

private tort action.
In Browning, the plaintiff broke his leg as a
result of falling on a city street which was in disrepair. 03 The court
took judicial notice of the public charter of the city.'0 4 The court
reasoned that the charter granted the municial corporation the duty,

authority, and the means to carry out its municipal functions.1o5 In
return for this grant of power, the municipality assumes a reciprocal
liability for failure to perform one of its municipal functions where
the duty to perform is clear and the means available.

°6

In holding

the municipality liable in Browning, the court did not distinguish
between those functions which were unique to a municipal corporation
and those in which the municipality took on the character of a private
corporation.

In subsequent decisions the Illinois Supreme Court limited the
scope of liability of a municipal corporation. The court used the

governmental/proprietary function distinction as a framework to

establish limitations on liability. In Culver v. City of Streator,0o the
plaintiff was shot by city employees who had been instructed to shoot
and kill stray, unlicensed dogs.10 The court characterized the employ98. See Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 I11.332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898) (a worker
was killed during the construction of a school building; the board of education of
the City of Chicago was held to be a quasi-municipal corporation and, therefore,
immune).
99. See Wilcox v. People, 90 I11.186, 192 (1878) (discussing the nature of the
Board of West Chicago Park Commissioners, a quasi-municipal corporation).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
101. 17 I11.143, 63 Am. Dec. 345 (1855).
102. Browning v. City of Springfield, 17 I11.143, 147, 63 Am. Dec. 349 (1855).
103. Id. at 143, 63 Am. Dec. at 345.
104. Id. at 147, 63 Am. Dec. at 349.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 130 I11.238, 22 N.E. 810 (1889).

108. Culver v. City of Streator, 130 11. 238, 239, 22 N.E. 810, 811 (1889).
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ees' function as an exercise of the municipality's police power. 109
According to the court, when the municipality exercised its police
power it performed a governmental function. 10 The court reasoned
that in performing a governmental function, a municipality was
discharging the duties imposed on it by law for the preservation and
promotion of the public good."' Therefore, while the municipality
was acting solely for the public benefit it should not be liable in
tort. 1 2 When the municipal corporation performed a proprietary
function, however, it assumed the characteristics of a private corporation. The proprietary functions of a municipality relate to the
management of its corporate or private concerns from which it often
derives some advantage or monetary gain." 3 Because of the private
nature of these functions, the municipality should be potentially liable
for the tortious conduct of its employees to the same extent as a
4
private corporation.'
The governmental/proprietary function distinction proved to be
troublesome to apply because some functions of a municipality share
the charateristics of both categories." 5 For example, the operation of
recreational facilities by a municipality was held to be a governmental
function.116 A municipality, however, was held to act in a proprietary
capacity when it rented rowboats to the public for use upon a lake
which was part of a municipality's water works system." 7
Additionally, Illinois courts have applied the discretionary/ministerial function distinction as a test to determine whether a municipality should be liable for its tortious conduct." 8 In Johnston v. City

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 243, 22 N.E. at 811.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244, 22 N.E. at 811.

113. Id. at 244-45, 22 N.E. at 811.
114. Id.

115. See, e.g., Eastern Illinois State Normal School v. City of Charleston, 271
Ill. 602, 111 N.E. 573 (1916). In supplying water for domestic or commercial purposes
a municipality exercised a proprietary function; however, when a municipality operated a waterworks for the purpose of public health and safety, such as fire protection
or flushing sewers, it was exercising a governmental function. Id. at 605, 111 N.E.
at 575.
116. See Gebhardt v. Village of La Grange Park, 354 Ill. 234, 188 N.E. 372

(1933) (transporting children to a municipal swimming pool).
117. See Cates v. City of Bloomington, 333 Ill. App. 189, 77 N.E.2d 46 (3d
Dist. 1947).
118. See Goodrich v. City of Chicago, 20 Ill. 445, 447-48 (1858) (plaintiff's

steamboat was damaged when it struck a submerged hull; removing a sunken hull
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9 the Illinois Supreme Court illustrated how the two tests
of Chicago"1

intertwine. Johnston involved the negligent operation of an automo-

bile used to deliver books to branch libraries by an employee of the
Chicago Public Library. 20 The court held the city liable, finding the
1 21 The
delivery of books by the employee to be a ministerial duty.

court reasoned that a municipality acted in a dual character. First, in
22
performing its governmental functions, a municipality is immune.
Govermental functions include the exercise of the judicial, legislative,
or discretionary authority of the municipality.123 Second, when acting
in a proprietary capacity, or performing a ministerial act, a municipality is liable for the negligence of its employees. 24 A ministerial act
is one involving the execution of a task required by law which does

not require the exercise of judgment or discretion.

25

When a munic-

ipality acts in a ministerial capacity, it has a duty to perform the task
"in a reasonably safe and skillful manner.' ' 26 While recognizing the

existence of these distinctions, the court stated that uniform applicarule was impossible and each case had to be decided on
tion of any
27
its facts.

In 1959, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302128 signaled a change in the
application of immunity to local governmental entities in Illinois. In

Molitor, the court held a school district liable for the torts committed
by its employees in the scope of their employment.

29

The plaintiff

suffered injuries when a school bus in which he was a passenger left
the road, struck a culvert, exploded, and burned. 30 The complaint
from the river was a discretionary function), aff'd, 72 U.S. 566 (1866); City of
371, 378, 46 N.E. 244, 246-47 (1897) (plaintiff was injured
Chicago v. Seben, 165 I11.
in a fall caused by a sewer in disrepair; construction of a sewer system is a
discretionary act, but maintenance of the sewer system is a ministerial duty and the
city may be held liable for failure to exercise ordinary care in the execution of such
a duty).
119. 258 Ill. 494, 101 N.E. 960 (1913).
494, 495, 101 N.E. 960, 961 (1913).
120. Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 I11.
121. Id. at 501, 101 N.E. at 963.
122. Id. at 498, 101 N.E. at 962.
123. Id. at 497-98, 101 N.E. at 962.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 498, 101 N.E. at 962.
127. Id. at 497, 101 N.E. at 961.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
128. 18 I11.
2d 11, 29, 163
129. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No 302, 18 I11.
(1960).
968
U.S.
362
denied,
cert.
N.E.2d 89, 98 (1959),
130. Id. at 13, 163 N.E.2d at 89.
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alleged that the crash was a result of negligence on the part of the
bus driver."' Previous decisions held school districts immune from
private tort actions as a quasi-municipal corporation.'32 The supreme
court, however, stated that a departure from precedent was warranted
by justice and public policy.'3 3 The court held that immunity did not
apply to the school district. 3 4 The court reasoned that the doctrine of
governmental immunity is opposed to the modern concept that individuals and corporations may be held liable for their tortious conduct. 3 ' The rationale of Molitor was adopted in subsequent decisions
in Illinois which clearly established that the judicial abolition of
common-law immunity applied to all quasi-municipal and municipal
13 6
corporations.
The Illinois legislature responded to Molitor's abolition of the
immunity of school districts by passing a series of acts granting
statutory immunity to selected governmental entities. 37 This piecemeal
approach to the restoration of immunity coalesced with the passage
of the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act'38 in 1965. The Act placed limitations on liability and
established procedures for pursuing tort claims against governmental
units and their employees.' 3 9
131. Id.
132. See Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898); Leviton
v. Board of Education, 374 I11.594, 30 N.E.2d 497 (1940). But see Thomas v.
Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 II1.App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (3d
Dist. 1952) (school district held liable to the limits of liability insurance coverage).
133. Molitor, 18 I11.2d at 26-27, 163 N.E.2d at 96.
134. Id. at 29, 163 N.E.2d at 98.
135. Id. at 20, 163 N.E.2d at 93.
136. See Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309, 226 N.E.2d 597 (1967)
(city liable for tortious acts of its police officers after Molitor); List v. O'Connor,
19 Ill. 2d 337, 340, 167 N.E.2d 188, 190 (1960) (stating in dicta that Molitor's
abolition of immunity would apply to park districts; but held defendant immune
because injury to plaintiff occurred prior to Molitor, which only applied prospectively).
137. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, 301.1 (1959) (immunity for counties)
(amended 1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, 491 (1959) (immunity for park districts),
repealed by Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act,
ch. 85, 1 10-101 (1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 1/2, 1 3(a) (1959) (immunity for
forest preserve districts), repealed by Local Government and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act, ch. 85, 10-101 (1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, para 333.2(a)
(1959) (immunity for Chicago Park District), repealed by Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, ch. 85, I 10-101 (1965).
138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, 1 1-101 to 10-101 (1965) (current version at ch.
85. 11 1-101 to 10-101 (1987)).
139. See Baum, Tort Liability of Local Governments and Their Employees: An
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THE PUBLIC DUTY/SPECIAL DUTY DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS

The public duty doctrine is also applied by Illinois courts as a
framework for determining when governmental entities and their
employees should not be held liable for their tortious conduct. The
public duty/special duty distinction was first recognized by the Illinois
Supreme Court in 1904 in the case of Gage v. Springer.'4° There, the
court found the board of local improvements of the City of Wilmette
owed a special duty to the plaintiff whose property was specially
assessed for the purpose of road construction. 14 The special duty
consisted of providing the full benefit of the improvements to which
the property owner was entitled because of the special assessment
levied upon his property. 142 That special duty was breached by the
construction of a substandard road.' 3 The court's analysis in Gage
centered on the relationship between the board of local improvements
and the plaintiff created by the special assessment. 44 The court held
that the plaintiff had an interest in the road created by the special
assessment that set her apart from the public in general.' 45 Because of
the plaintiff's interest, the board owed a special duty to the plaintiff
not to construct a substandard road. 146
1.

The Special Duty Test

The criteria applied by Illinois courts to determine whether a
special duty exists were united into the form of a four-pronged test
by the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District in Bell v. Village
of Midlothian.147 In Bell, the plaintiff sustained an injury while riding
a minibike on property over which the village exercised its police
powers. 48 The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the village knew of
Introduction to the Illinois Immunity Act, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 981 (providing an
overview of the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act in its original form).
140. 211 Ill. 200, 71 N.E. 860 (1904).
141. Gage v. Springer, 211 Ill. 200, 206, 71 N.E. 860, 862 (1904).
142. Id. at 207, 71 N.E. at 863.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 204, 71 N.E. at 862.
145. Id. at 206-07, 71 N.E. at 863. The court stated the public duty/special duty
rule: "The failure of a public officer to perform a public duty can constitute an
individual wrong only when some person can show that in the public duty was
involved also a duty to himself as an individual, and that he has suffered a special
and peculiar injury by reason of its nonperformance." Id. at 204, 71 N.E. at 862.
146. Id. at 206, 71 N.E. at 862-63.
147. 90 Ill. App. 3d 967, 414 N.E.2d 104 (lst Dist. 1980).
148. Bell v. City of Midlothian, 90 Ill. App. 3d 967, 968, 414 N.E.2d 104, 105
(1st Dist. 1980).
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the dangerous trails and jumps on the property, yet failed to exercise
its police powers to abate the dangerous condition. 49 The court
concluded that the situation fell within the public duty rule which
does not impose liability on local governmental units for a failure to
exercise their police powers. 15 0 The court then held that the municipality was not liable because the plaintiff had not satisfied the criteria
necessary to establish that the village owed him a special duty. 5 , The
elements of the special duty test formulated by the Bell court are:
1) The municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular
danger or risk to which the plaintiff is exposed.
2) There must be allegations of specific acts or omissions on
the part of the municipality.
3) The specific acts or omissions on the part of the municipal
employees must be either affirmative or willful in nature.
4) The injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct
and immediate control of employees or agents of the munici52
pality. 1
The Bell court drew upon previous Illinois decisions in formulating the four-pronged special duty test. The first two elements of the
test were derived from the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Huey v. Town of Cicero.' In Huey-a wrongful death action-the
plaintiff alleged willful and wanton neglect on the part of the police
department in failing to provide his son with adequate police protection. '1 4 Jerome Huey-an African-American-was attacked and beaten
to death by four Caucasian youths armed with baseball bats. Mr.
Huey was on his way to an employment office in Cicero at the time
of the attack.' The complaint alleged that the police knew or should
have known that a large number of African-Americans entered Cicero
daily to pursue employment, and that the presence of an AfricanAmerican in Cicero at that time constituted a hazard to Mr. Huey's
personal safety. 5 6 In reviewing whether the complaint had stated a
cause of action, the court applied the public duty rule. 5 7 The court
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 969, 414 N.E.2d at 106.
Id. at 970, 414 N.E.2d at 106-07.
Id. at 970, 414 N.E.2d at 106.
41 Ill. 2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1969).
Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 111. 2d 361, 362, 243 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1968).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 364, 243 N.E.2d at 216.
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noted that Jerome Huey had not requested police protection, nor did
the Cicero police have any knowledge that he was present in the town
at the time of the attack.' The plaintiff's complaint also failed to
59
allege any specific act or omission on the part of the Cicero police.
The court held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to make factual
allegations which were sufficient to establish that the municipality
owed Jerome Huey a special duty to provide him with police protection. 6, 0
The special duty analysis of the Huey court did not address the
criteria that make up the third and fourth elements of the Bell test.
Nevertheless, from the facts presented in Huey it seems clear that
neither of these elements would have been satisfied. Mr. Huey apparently could make no factual allegations of any willful or affirmative
acts on the part of the Cicero police, nor was Mr. Huey in the direct
control of the police at the time of his injury.
The third prong of the special duty test was attributed by the
Bell court to the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District in Keane v. City of Chicago.'6' In Keane, the plaintiff sued
for the wrongful death of his wife-a teacher-who was murdered on
the school's premises by a student.162 The plaintiff made three allegations. 63 First, the police department was negligent in not providing
protection to those on the premises. Second, the police department
removed protection that had previously been provided, although it
knew or should have known a dangerous condition existed. Third,
the police were negligent in allowing dangerous conditions to continue
to exist. In holding the defendant not liable, the court found these
allegations insufficient to serve as the basis for the city to owe a
special duty to the decedent.'6 The court stated that the failure of
the municipality to perform a public duty, such as the provision of
police protection, does not open the city to liability. 65 A tortious act
on the part of an employee which is willful or affirmative, however,
may be sufficient to establish a special duty, thus making the municipality liable. The court asserted that an affirmative act which would
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
(lst Dist.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
98 Ill. App. 2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1st Dist. 1968).
Keane v. City of Chicago, 98 I11.App. 2d 460, 461, 240 N.E.2d 321, 321
1968).
Id. at 461, 240 N.E.2d at 322.
Id. at 463, 240 N.E.2d at 322.
Id.
Id. at 462, 240 N.E.2d at 322.
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establish a special duty would require the police to place the plaintiff
in a position where an injury to him was foreseeable. 167 The court's
requirement of an affirmative or willful act on the part of the police
apparently mandates that the conduct of the police must go beyond
merely increasing the magnitude of a general risk which the plaintiff
may face. Rather, the conduct of the police must focus particularly
on the plaintiff.
The fourth prong of the special duty test was attributed by the
Bell court to the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District in Brooks v. Lundeen.168 In Brooks-a wrongful death
action- -the plaintiff's husband was killed when his automobile was
struck by a driver attempting to elude the police. 69 The police
established a roadblock in an attempt to stop the driver. Mr. Brooks,
approaching the roadblock, was directed to the side of the road
behind the roadblock and detained there. The driver approached the
roadblock at a high rate of speed, detoured around the roadblock,
and crashed head-on into Mr. Brooks' automobile. 70
The court held that the police had an affirmative duty to warn
Mr. Brooks of the dangerous situation.'' This special duty existed
based on the officers' knowledge of the potential danger, their failure
to inform the decedent, and the detention of the decedent in a place
of potential danger by the officers. 7 2 The detention of Mr. Brooks at
the scene of the roadblock formed the basis of the "direct and
immediate control" element of the four-pronged test from Bell.
IV.

A.

APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC DUTY/SPECIAL DUTY DOCTRINE IN
ILLINOIS
n
TREPA CHKO v. VILLAGE OF WESTHA VE

73

The recent decision of the Illinois Court of Appeals for the First
District in Trepachko illustrates the application of the public duty/
special duty doctrine in cases involving police conduct. The first
question that a court must resolve when presented with factual
allegations involving police conduct concerns the characterization of
167. Id.
168. 49 11. App. 3d 1, 364 N.E.2d 423 (2d Dist. 1977).
169. Brooks v. Lundeen, 49 I11.App. 3d 1, 3-4, 364 N.E.2d 423, 425-26 (2d
Dist. 1977).
170. Id. at 4-5, 364 N.E.2d at 426.
171. Id. at 7, 364 N.E.2d at 427-28.
172. Id. at 7, 364 N.E.2d at 428.
173. 184 Il1. App. 3d 241, 540 N.E.2d 342 (1st Dist. 1989).
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the nature of the duty as presented by the pleadings. Should the court
interpret the plaintiff's characterization of the police conduct as a
failure to provide police protection, the public duty doctrine applies.
Thus, the municipality and the officer would not be liable unless the
plaintiff could establish the existence of a special duty. 74 If, however,
the court accepts the plaintiff's characterization of the police conduct
as constituting activity other than a failure to provide police protection, then the potential liability of the officer and municipality
increases. In Illinois, police officers and municipalities may be liable
for their willful or wanton conduct in the execution or enforcement
of any law.' Furthermore, police officers may be liable for their
negligent conduct in the performance of duties which fall outside of
76
the enforcement or execution of any law.'
In Trepachko, the plaintiffs claimed that the negligence of a
village police officer resulted in the wrongful deaths of the plaintiffs'
children.' 7 7 The circumstances arose when the officer stopped a vehicle
for a traffic violation. The vehicle stopped in the right-curb lane of
the highway. The officer positioned his squad car behind the vehicle.
The officer then shined his spotlight toward the car's rearview mirror,
and directed the driver to move the car to the median lane which
separated the opposing lanes of traffic.' 78 While the officer continued
to shine his spotlight on the rearview mirror, the driver moved his
car across the highway. As the vehicle crossed the two lanes of traffic,
the motorcycle on which the plaintiffs' children were riding collided
with the car. 17 9
174. See supra text accompanying note 152.
175. Section 2-202 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act addresses the liability of
public employees for willful or wanton conduct. It states:
A public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or
enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and
wanton conduct.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, 1 2-202 (1987).
176. Section 2-202 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act does not make a police
officer immune for all of his activities short of willful and wanton conduct. It is
recognized that a police officer is liable for his negligent conduct during his duty
hours for activities not in the execution or enforcement of a law. See Arnolt v. City
of Highland Park, 52 Ill. 2d 27, 33, 282 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1972) (plaintiff permitted
to maintain a cause of action for negligence against the city and police officer which
arose when the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of an automobile crash with a
police vehicle).
177. Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven, 184 Ill. App. 3d 241, 243, 540 N.E.2d
342, 343 (1st Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 642 (1989).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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The trial court held that the public duty doctrine applied and
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failing to plead or establish a
special duty owed to the decedents by the police officer and the
Village.8 0 The First District affirmed, agreeing with the trial court's
characterization of the officer's actions as a failure to provide police
protection to the decedents.' The court rejected the plaintiff's argument which attempted to characterize the officer's duty as one to
exercise ordinary care in the performance of his duties as a police
officer." 2 To accept the plaintiff's characterization of the officer's
conduct, in the opinion of the court, would be to give too narrow of
an interpretation to the term "police protection."' 83 The court found
that the basis of the plaintiffs' complaint was that the police officer
failed to perform his duties "in a manner protective of the decedent's
safety.'1 4 The court reasoned that the public duty doctrine applied,
because the duty to provide protection was owed to the entire community rather than any one individual.'8 5
Applying the four-pronged special duty test, the court found that
the "direct and immediate control" element was not satisfied. 8 6 The
court reasoned that the officer's control of the driver of the automobile was irrelevant to establishing whether a special duty was owed
to the decedents. 18 7 For the "control" element to be satisfied, the
plaintiffs' complaint would have to present a factual allegation that
the decedents were in the officer's control.'
The Trepachko decision illustrates the problems facing a plaintiff
in trying to establish a cause of action for negligence when the
governmental conduct is characterized as a failure to provide police
protection. The Trepachko court stated that the public duty doctrine
as codified in section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act was supported
by "strong public policy considerations."'81 9 According to the court,
expanding the duty to provide police protection to every member of
180. Id. at 244, 540 N.E.2d at 343.
181. Id. at 250, 540 N.E.2d at 348.
182. Id. at 245-46, 540 N.E.2d at 344-45. The dissent would have followed a
line of case law in Illinois in which police officers were held liable for failing to
exercise ordinary care for the safety of others when carrying out their responsibilities.
See id. at 252, 540 N.E.2d 349 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 246, 540 N.E.2d at 345.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 244, 540 N.E.2d at 344.
186. Id. at 248, 540 N.E.2d at 346.

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 244, 540 N.E.2d at 344.
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the community would mean that the police would be required to
guarantee the safety of each individual; this would be functionally
unworkable.'90 The Trepachko court, like other Illinois courts, apparently view the functional concerns of law enforcement as outweighing
the need to compensate an individual for a loss which may be the
result of governmental conduct.
B. POLINY v. SOTO'

The decision in Poliny is representative of the difficulty that a
plaintiff may have in establishing the existence of a special duty when
faced with fulfilling the requirements of the four-pronged special duty
test as enunciated in Bell. That difficulty centers on the tendency of
Illinois courts to strictly interpret the "control" element of the test.
The plaintiff, Valiant Poliny, claimed that he and Donald Nagolski
were attacked and beaten by Rolando Calderon on a city street.192 As
a result of the attack, Nagolski was taken to a hospital by witnesses
at the scene. Calderon left the scene, and the plaintiff followed him
for several blocks. Upon encountering a police car, the plaintiff
reported the attack to the patrol officers. The officers then arrested
Calderon.1 93 As the arrest was taking place, and in the presence of
the officers, two friends of Calderon verbally threatened the plaintiff.
The plaintiff asked the officers to "assist him back to the stationhouse.' ' 94 The officers refused the plaintiff's request. After the
officers departed, the plaintiff was attacked and beaten by one of
95
Calderon's friends.1
. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim against
the city and
the officers, finding that it failed to state a cause of action. 96 The
First District affirmed, holding that the city and its police officers did
not owe the plaintiff a special duty to protect him from attack. 197 The
plaintiff conceded, and the court agreed, that the "control" element
of the special duty test was not satisfied. 198 The plaintiff argued that
the "control" element should be eliminated as a requirement for the
190.
191.
192.
1988).
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
178 Il1. App. 3d 203, 533 N.E.2d 15 (1st Dist. 1988).
Poliny v. Soto, 178 I1. App. 3d 203, 205, 533 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1st Dist.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 206, 533 N.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 212, 533 N.E.2d at 21.
Id. at 207, 533 N.E.2d at 18.
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existence of a special duty. The plaintiff based his argument on the
premise that the Brooks case, which was cited by the Bell court in
support of the "control" element, was misread. 99 The plaintiff maintained that BrooksY2 ° provides insufficient support for an element
which requires that the police must be in control of the individual
when the injury occurs. The Poliny court rejected the plaintiff's
argument, noting the tacit approval of the special duty test by the
Illinois Supreme Court. 20 1 The court in Poliny also rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the "control" element should be relaxed to
include situations where a material witness to a crime requires police
protection. 20 2 The court reasoned that the plaintiff's cooperation was
not requested by the police. Rather, the plaintiff volunteered his
assistance in apprehending Calderon. 2 3 In the court's view, this
difference was sufficient to distinguish the case at bar from the cases
cited by the plaintiff which held that the police may owe a special
duty of protection to a material witness. 2°4
It is recognized that a mere request for police protection is
insufficient to establish a special duty.20 5 This applies even in circum199. Id. at 207-08, 533 N.E.2d at 18-19.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 168-172.
201. Poliny v. Soto, 178 Ill. App. 3d 203, 207-08, 533 N.E.2d 15, 18-i9 (1st
Dist. 1988) (citing Curtis v. County of Cook, 98 Ill. 2d 158, 165, 456 N.E.2d 116,
120 (1983) where the Illinois Supreme Court stated "the appellate court's treatment
of [the special duty] issue [was] both adequate and correct"). In Curtis, the First
District applied the four-pronged test in finding that police did not owe a special
duty to patrol or take steps to deter speeding at the site where plaintiff was involved
in an automobile accident. Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 Ill. App. 3d 400, 407, 440
N.E.2d 942, 947 (1st Dist. 1982).
202. Poliny, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 533 N.E.2d at 19.
203. Id.
204. Mr. Poliny relied on Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71 111. App. 2d
373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1st Dist. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 128 Il1. App. 2d
157, 262 N.E.2d 829 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971), in which the plaintiff
was asked by police to accompany them to the site where they had apprehended
suspects in an earlier attack on the plaintiff. While identifying the suspects at the
scene, the suspects attacked and injured the plaintiff. The court held that the police
owed the plaintiff a special duty of protection by placing him in a position of peril.
Id. at 380, 219 N.E.2d at 150. Mr. Poliny also relied on Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), in which the plaintiff's
son responded to an FBI flyer seeking the whereabouts of a fugitive. Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiff's son was shot and killed by an unknown assailant. The court
held that a special duty was owed to the decedent by the police's use of him to make
an arrest of the fugitive. Id. at 80-81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
205. See Porter v. City of Urbana, 88 Il. App. 3d 443, 446, 410 N.E.2d 610,
613 (4th Dist. 1980).
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stances where the police are aware that an individual may suffer
injuries as a result of police inaction . 2° The rationale supporting this
rule is that, in order to perform effectively, police officers need to
have freedom to exercise discretion in the performance of their
duties. 20 7 Therefore, when a police officer makes a mistake in judgment about whether to provide police services, liability should not be
imposed upon him or the municipality. 20 8 To do so would make the
police insurers of the safety of every individual with whom they have
official contact. 2°9
Authority exists, however, for the proposition that a special duty
is created between the police and an individual who has collaborated
with the police in the arrest or prosecution of a criminal. 21 0 A three-

pronged test has been suggested for evaluating whether a special duty
exists in such cases. 21 First, the police must request an individual or
the general public to assist in the arrest or prosecution of a criminal.
Second, the individual must respond to the police request. Third, it
must reasonably appear to the police that the individual is in danger
due to his collaboration. 21 2 The rationale supporting the existence of
a special duty in "collaboration" cases is derived from the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in In re Quarles.2 1 1 In Quarles,

the Court stated that a citizen has a right to inform law enforcement

authorities of a violation of the law. 2 4 Furthermore, the government
206. See Santy v. Bresee, 129 Ill. App. 3d 658, 662, 473 N.E.2d 69, 72 (4th
Dist. 1984), appeal denied, (1985).
207. See Poliny v. Soto, 178 I11.App. 3d 203, 210, 533 N.E.2d 15, 20 (1st Dist.
1988).
208. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 94, 154 N.E.2d 534, 545,
180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 281 (1958) (Conway, J., dissenting).
209. See Poliny, 178 111.App. 3d at 209-10, 533 N.E.2d at 20.
210. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Penn. 1983)
(special duty created when individual supplied information concerning a series of
crimes to the FBI at their request), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1448 (3d Cir. 1984); Schuster v.
City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (special
duty created when individual informed police of fugitive's whereabouts in response
to FBI flyer); Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond 178 Ind. App. 669, 383
N.E.2d 1081 (1978) (special duty created when individual assisted police in the
investigation of gang activity by allowing his commercial property to be searched for
evidence).
211. See Miller, 561 F. Supp. at 1135.
212. Id.
213. 158 U.S. 532 (1894). Quarles was convicted of conspiracy in connection
with a battery and attempted murder of an informant who reported illicit alcohol
production to a United States Deputy Marshall. Id. at 533.
214. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 537 (1894).
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has a duty to insure that an individual is able to exercise her right
and protect her from violence while doing so."5
In deciding not to alter the criteria for the existence of a special
duty, the Poliny court weighed the policy considerations implicit in
the "collaboration" approach. 21 6 The plaintiff argued that if material
witnesses cannot be assured of some degree of police protection
citizens will be hesitant to become involved in volunteering assistance
to the police. 211 The court maintained, however, that a strict application of the "control" factor of Illinois' special duty test is necessary
to avoid placing too great of a burden on law enforcement. 2 8 The
court reasoned that law enforcement would be hindered if police
officers were not allowed to exercise discretion in setting their priorities concerning the efficient performance of their duties. 219 Furthermore, the difficulty that police would have in determining when a
involve an unwarranted
witness was legitimately in danger 22could
0
manpower.
and
time
consumption of
It is clear that the plaintiff in Poliny would not have been able
to establish a special duty even under the "collaboration" test. Mr.
22
Poliny's collaboration with the police was at his own instigation. '
Therefore, the first element of the collaboration test 222 would not be
satisfied. Furthermore, there is no evident authority for the position
that a special duty should exist in the absence of a request for
assistance by the police.
It is not difficult to hypothesize a scenerio, however, in which
an individual collaborates with the police at their request but is injured
outside of their "direct and immediate control." Such circumstances
raise the question of whether Illinois courts, applying the test from
Bell, would find a special duty to exist. A strict application of the
"control" element of the special duty test would lead to the conclusion
that a special duty would not be established under such circumstances.
The effect of such an application of the special duty test is that the
police owe no duty to an individual even though their affirmative act
places the individual in a position of peril and results in an injury to
215.
216.
1988).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 536.
Poliny v. Soto, 178 Ill. App. 3d 203, 209-10, 533 N.E.2d 15, 20 (1st Dist.
Id. at 209, 533 N.E.2d at 19.
See id. at 209, 533 N.E.2d at 20.
Id. at 210, 533 N.E.2d at 20.
See id. at 209-10, 533 N.E.2d at 20.
Id. at 205, 533 N.E.2d at 17.
See supra text accompanying notes 211-212.
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the individual. Other jurisdictions have viewed this result as inequitable and would find a special duty to exist where an individual
collaborates with the police at their request but was not in their
presence when injured. 2 3 The ultimate question seems to be whether
the policy concerns advanced by Illinois courts could be adequately
served by a special duty test which would allow greater latitude to a
plaintiff seeking to establish a cause of action through the special
duty doctrine.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGING ILLINOIS' APPROACH TO THE
PUBLIC DUTY/SPECIAL DUTY DOCTRINE

The public duty doctrine as codified in section 4-102 of the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act broadly insulates the police and municipalities from liability for providing general police protection. 224 In
addition, the strict requirements of the four-pronged special duty test
as set forth in BelP25 only allow a plaintiff to establish a special duty
in rare situations. The need for such broad limitations on liability in
the aiea of police protection is generally justified by public policy
considerations which center on the functional aspects of police activity. The basis of these policy considerations is that police require a
substantial amount of discretion in determining how and when police
resources should be allocated. 26 This discretion, at times, must be
exercised by the officer in the field under circumstances where it may
be impractical to consult with superiors.2 27 Thus, for a court, in
hindsight, to impose on the officer a duty to protect an individual
would result in an unwarranted interference by the judicial branch in
228
a decision properly allocated to the executive branch.
Focusing solely on these policy concerns, however, ignores the
role of the police in our society. The nature of police functions can
be viewed as a monopoly on the power to protect citizens who, in
certain situations, rely on such protection.2 29 This power to assert
physical control and use force for the protection of individuals who
223. See cases cited supra note 210.
224. See supra note 29.
225. See supra text accompanying note 152.
226. See Poliny v. Soto, 178 I11.App. 3d 203, 210, 533 N.E.2d 15, 20 (1st Dist.
1988); Seibring v. Parcell's, Inc. 159 I11.App. 3d 676, 680, 512 N.E.2d 394, 397 (4th
Dist. 1987).
227. Seibring, 159 I11.App. 3d at 680, 512 N.E. 2d at 397.
228. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 582, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861,
293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (1968).
229. See M. SHAPo, THE DuTY To ACT 100 (1977).

1990:2691

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

depend upon it may be viewed as a source of a duty. 230 In response
to direct contact with the police, the individual may forego other
means of protection in reliance on police protection.23 ' At times, the
police may default on their professional obligation to use their power
in situations where their actions have caused an individual to rely on
police protection. 23 2 If this default is sufficiently egregious the officer
may be subject to. departmental sanctions or criminal prosecution.233
Nevertheless, these measures fall short of providing a remedy for an
individual who is injured as a result of the failure of the police to
provide him with protection.
It should be recognized that situations can occur where an
individual's reliance on police protection arising from affirmative
police conduct can create a special duty without the individual being
in the "direct and immediate control" of the police. 23 4 Such circumstances may include: (1) when a court order of protection has been
issued to an individual; 251 (2) when police make an explicit assurance
of protection to an individual, causing him to forego other avenues
of protection; 23 6 and (3) when a material witness collaborates with the
police at their request, is injured as a result, and the injury occurs
outside of the "direct control" of the police. 237 Of course, in such
circumstances the liability of the police should not be determined on
a strict liability basis. It would seem, however, that these cases should
230. Id.
231. See Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 584-85, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 900
(Keating, J., dissenting) (noting that Ms. Riss obeyed the gun laws in force at the
time of her attack and was not carrying a weapon despite numerous threats of harm
by a known antagonist).
232. See Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451
(1983) (police dispatcher assured plaintiff that assistance was on its way to the scene
of plaintiff's emergency calls).
233. See Porter v. City of Urbana, 88 Ill. App. 3d 443, 446, 410 N.E.2d 610,
612 (4th Dist. 1980).
234. The West Virginia Supreme Court recently declined to adopt the fourpronged special duty test used in Illinois. The court based its decision on the
restrictiveness of the "control" element of the Illinois test. Wolfe v. City of Wheeling,
387 S.E.2d 307, 311 n.7 (W. Va. 1989).
235. See Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985) (an order of protection was issued to mother and child against
father; police were aware of father's threats and mother's request for assistance
therefrom).
236. See supra note 232.
237. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (witness responded to FBI request for assistance in apprehending
fugitive; witness was shot and killed three weeks later).
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not be dismissed solely on the grounds that a duty was not owed to
the plaintiff merely because of her lack of proximity to the police at
the time of her injury. The plaintiff in such situations must still
surmount the hurdle of establishing that the police conduct was the
proximate cause of her injury. In many cases this conventional tort
principle will be sufficient to safeguard the interests asserted by the
municipality. In cases where the plaintiff has a meritorious claim,
however, recovery should not be denied by a mechanistic application
of a duty analysis.
The four-pronged special duty test applied by Illinois courts
oversimplifies the duty analysis in police protection situations. The
test leaves no room for a balancing of other factors relevant to the
formation of a special duty. In practice, the special duty analysis
often hinges on the "control" element. 2 a1 It would seem that a less
rigid special duty analysis would achieve a more equitable result.
Several other factors have been suggested as being relevant to the
special duty analysis. First, the court should weigh the amount and
quality of the information possessed by the police concerning the
situation. 2 9 Second, the ability of the individual to defend himself
against the attack or injury should be considered. 240 Third, the court
should determine the degree to which the individual relied on police
assurances of protection.2 41 A special duty analysis which would allow
a balancing of these factors as well as the factors already considered
in Bell's four-pronged test would be better suited to making the
special duty exception to the public duty doctrine a viable means for
a plaintiff with a meritorious claim to recover damages.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Traditional immunity doctrines and the public duty rule have
historically been viewed as necessary to protect governmental operations from the economic and functional consequences of excess tort
liability. However, many states have discarded these doctrines because
238. See, e.g., Fessler by Fessler v. R.E.J., Inc., 161 Il. App. 3d 290, 514
N.E.2d 515 (4th Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 118 Ill. 2d 542 (1988); Seibring v.
Parcell's Inc., 159 111. App. 3d 676, 512 N.E.2d 394 (4th Dist. 1987); Hernandez v.
Village of Cicero, 151 Il1. App. 3d 170, 502 N.E.2d 1226 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal
denied, 115 Ill. 2d 541 (1987); Marshall v. Ellison, 132 Il1. App. 3d 732, 477 N.E.2d
830 (4th Dist. 1985); Marvin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 113 Ill. App. 3d 172, 446
N.E.2d 1183 (1st Dist. 1983).
239. See SHAPo, supra note 229, at 107.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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they were viewed as being outdated. The modern trend is toward an
expansion of governmental liability for the tortious conduct of its
employees acting within the scope of their duty. States now employ
other means of protection to safeguard their interests. These include
liability insurance, reserve funds, and limitations on recoverable damages. In addition, requiring the plaintiff to establish the traditional
elements of a negligence claim can prove to be sufficient protection
for the governmental entity and their employees.
Illinois' application the public duty/special duty doctrine, in the
context of a municipality's duty to provide police protection, seems
overly restrictive when compared to modern trends. While the governmental interests at stake are substantial, to -totally deny recovery to a
plaintiff who may have a meritorious claim because she cannot satisfy
the strict requirements of the special duty exception may achieve an
inequitable result. Therefore, it would seem that Illinois should modify
its criteria for the existence of a special duty. As other states have
found, the minimal increase in exposure to liability will not subvert
the interests traditionally protected by the public duty and immunity
doctrines.
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